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Abstract
Merger activity is intense during economic booms and subdued during recessions. This
paper provides a non-financial explanation for this observable pattern. We construct a model
in which the target—by setting the takeover price—screens the acquirer on his (expected)
ability to realize synergy gains when merging. In an economic boom, it is less profitable to
sort out relatively “bad fit” acquirers, leading to a hike in merger activity. Although positive
economic shocks produce expected gains at the time of merging, these mergers turn out to
be less efficient in the long term—a finding that is broadly consistent with the existing
empirical evidence. Furthermore, again because of the absence of boom-time screening, the
more efficient acquirers earn higher merger profits during “merger waves” than outside of
waves, which is also in line with empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
The existence of periods of intense merger activity, typically referred to as merger waves,
is well documented (Andrade and Stafford, 2004).1 Merger activity usually heats up in
economic booms and slows down in recessions (see e.g. Maksimovic and Philips, 2001).
Numerous empirical papers point to various exogenous factors like technological inno-
vation, deregulation, or a demand boom as triggers of merger waves (see e.g. Harford,
2005). There is, however, surprisingly little analysis of how a change in the economic
fundamentals can generate a spike in merger activity.
This paper proposes a mechanism that, despite its simplicity, is consistent with a
variety of stylized facts about mergers. In our model, the target in a potential merger
commits to a takeover price. This enables the target to screen acquirers on the expected
synergy gains. Changes in the economic environment that often coincide with a boom
induce mergers that would not have occurred otherwise. The reason being that—in an
economic boom—merging becomes more profitable and merging with low-synergy types
becomes more similar to merging with high-synergy types. This raises the opportunity
cost of sorting out relatively inefficient acquirers. The target, therefore, sets a takeover
price that is acceptable to both high- and relatively low-type acquirers—leading to a hike
in mergers. Thus, an exogenous shift in the economic conditions causes a lack of screening
and, as a consequence, a merger cluster or a merger wave.
This lack of screening during booms not only helps explain procyclical spikes in merger
activity but also enables the more efficient, high-type acquirers to extract more rents from
a merger. This is consistent with recent evidence that in a merger wave, bidders gain on
average higher (short term) abnormal returns than bidders outside a wave (Harford, 2003;
Gugler et al., 2006; Rosen, 2006).2 Furthermore, in line with our mechanism, Carow et al.
(2004) find that during waves high-type acquirers earn more from a merger than low-type
1Weston et al. (1990) and Martynova and Renneboog (2005) provide excellent reviews of the literature.
2Some empirical evidence we will cite in the paper is based on merger waves that coincide with periods
of high stock markets rather than economic booms. These stock market booms, however, are (highly)
correlated with economic booms as e.g. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) indicate.
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acquirers.
At the same time, our mechanism can also explain why, on average, mergers that
occurred in a wave during an economic boom are less efficient than non-wave mergers.
Mergers during a baisse should stay relatively more profitable in the long term, since these
are better filtered out by the target. Indeed, in the long term, wave mergers perform on
average significantly worse than non-wave mergers, as Gugler et al. (2006), Harford (2003)
and Rosen (2006) show. In our model, merged entities are possibly even less efficient than
non-merging firms, which is again consistent with empirical evidence of Carow et al.
(2004).
Our modeling approach explicitly embodies two related features about mergers that
have been prominent in the literature. First, one empirical regularity is that the target
extracts considerable rents from bidders in a takeover (see Andrade et al., 2001). There-
fore, as Inderst and Wey (2004), we model takeovers as a process in which the target
can commit to an optimal reserve price. This is also in line with Cramton (1998), who
compares the various tactics employed by the target firm and concludes that these are
equivalent to the setting of an (implicit) reserve price.3 In contrast to Inderst and Wey
(2004), our model consists of a single potential acquirer bidding for the target.4 This al-
lows us to abstract from the free-rider problems between acquirers, emphasized by Inderst
and Wey (2004). Below, however, we argue that our results can be extended to the case
of multiple bidders.
Second, in the takeover process not only information about the quality of the target
is important but also information about the cost synergies that may arise with different
acquirers, i.e. the goodness of fit. The distribution of information about potential cost
3Cramton (1998) states that ”A target’s board has a great deal of discretion in establishing proce-
dures...This power arises from the target’s prior issuance of a poison pill. In essence, a poison pill makes
any acquisition unprofitable...Hence all bids are made conditional on the target board redeeming its pill.
At best, poison pills afford the board a (limited) ability to set a reserve price.”
4Andrade at al. (2001) do find that the average transaction in the 1990s involved only one bidder;
for the period 1973-1998, the number of bidders per deal was on average 1.1. Also, Boone and Mulherin
(2006) find strong evidence that the returns to bidders in auctions are similar to the returns to single
bidders, suggesting that a bidding war is not responsible for the target’s rent extraction.
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synergies across bidders, banks, and targets has played an important role in the analysis
of takeover processes. In Scharfstein (1988) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004),
the raider has private information about the synergistic gain or loss of a merger relative
to the target. One justification for this assumption, which we also adopt, is that acquirers
are on average substantially larger, older, and more experienced in merger activities than
targets (see e.g. Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Thus, to get information on synergy gains
is substantially easier and relatively cheaper for the acquirer. Also, it seems natural to
think that potential acquirers spend considerable time working out a future business plan
in the event that the deal is successful.
The target considers the following trade-off in our setting. By requesting a high
takeover price, it extracts (all) merger rents whenever the post-merger efficiency gains are
high, i.e. whenever the raider is a “good-fit” acquirer (high type). By doing so, however,
the target risks that it cannot sell if the acquirer turns out to be a relatively “bad fit”
(low type). The target thus compares the gains of setting a high price (and thereby
screening the acquirers) to setting a low price and selling for certain (pooling acquirers).
An economic boom makes pooling acquirers more attractive as long as (1) merging (with
any type of acquirer) becomes more profitable and (2) the benefit of merging with a
relatively low-type acquirer approaches that of merging with a high-type acquirer.
Both conditions are satisfied in our basic market model, where an economic boom
is generated by a rise in demand in a Salop-type circular-city model5 in which mergers
involve fixed costs.6 This is due to two underlying forces. First, since prices are strategic
complements, a merger is a commitment to set higher prices—the fat cat strategy in
the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)—and this commitment is more valuable
5To facilitate technical issues, we follow Cabral (2003) and use quadratic transportation costs to model
product differentiation rather than linear transportation costs as Salop (1979) does.
6See also Davidson and Deneckere (1985) who argue that merger models based on price competition
with differentiated goods are suitable in explaining observed facts of mergers. Furthermore, as argued in
Lambrecht (2004), mergers involve significant one-of costs, such as legal fees, fees to investment banks
and other merger promotors, and the costs of restructuring and integrating the two companies (see e.g.
Houston et al., 2001).
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when demand is higher. Second, if demand is higher, merging with the low-type acquirer
becomes relatively more attractive as the one-off merging costs become relatively less
important. After providing a general expression for conditions (1) and (2) above, we
show that our mechanism is also present in mergers across independent markets and in
vertically related markets.7
Other recent theoretical work has made advances in explaining the procyclicality of
merger activity. Lambrecht (2004) shows that when merger synergies are an increasing
function of a (stochastic) product market demand, then each firm’s payoff from merging
has features similar to call options. Firms therefore have an incentive to merge (exert
their option) in periods of economic expansion. Toxvaerd (2004) shows that if an increase
in an economic fundamental increases the number of expected future mergers, this in turn
can induce preemptive mergers today, leading to cluster effects. Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002) show that bursts in merger activity may follow from technological shocks that lead
to a higher dispersion of efficiency in an industry. These shocks lead to a reallocation of
physical assets from less efficient targets to more efficient acquirers. Similar with ours,
the above mentioned models find pro-cyclical merger clustering. Our screening model,
however, differs in that it succeeds to explain long-term less efficient wave-mergers and
higher returns for wave-acquirers at the time of merging.
In contrast to our findings, Fauli-Oller (2000) demonstrates that in a Cournot model
with constant marginal costs, merger waves are more likely when there is a low realization
of demand. The most common interpretation of the “constant-marginal-cost” Cournot
merger model is that the merger leads to the closure of the less efficient merger participant
(see Perry and Porter, 1985). From this perspective, Fauli-Oller (2000) provides a ratio-
nale for elimination of excess capacity in declining industries (see also Dutz, 1989, and
Lambrecht and Myers, 2005, for a similar rationale).8 Our basic market model is a vari-
7Our conditions are also satisfied in other modelling specifications. For example, in a Cournot set-up
with capacity constraints, a merger sometimes conduces little output expansion by outsiders. Higher
demand can then lead to higher incentives to merge (see Van Wegberg, 1994).
8A case study of Dutz (1989) and casual evidence in Lambrecht and Myers (2005) indicate that this
has occurred in some particular troubled industries. The systematic evidence on merger waves, however,
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ant of Salop’s (1979) circular-city model of price competition with differentiated goods.
This setup allows the acquirer to benefit from operating the acquired firm—indeed, in
non-declining industries acquirers typically do not close the acquired production sites
(Lambrecht, 2004).
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the basic model.
Section 3 establishes our main result and compares our findings with stylized facts gath-
ered from the empirical merger literature. In Section 4, we outline general conditions for
our predictions and provide further examples and extensions. Finally, in Section 5, we
conclude. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Basic Model
There are three firms in the market. Absent a merger, all three produce at a marginal (and
average) cost c.9 A given firm, the acquirer, is potentially interested in buying another
firm, the target. If the acquirer is a good fit (“high type”), it can reduce the marginal cost
of both units to cm = c < c. If less fitting (“low type”), it can only operate the joint entity
at marginal cost cm = c¯ > c.
10 The common prior that the post-merger marginal cost is
cm = c is q; with probability (1− q) it is cm = c.11 Prior to the merger process, however,
the acquirer collects information about the profitability of the transaction. Formally, the
acquirer receives a perfect private signal about the realized cm. When firms merge, they
incur a fixed restructuring cost of merging R > 0.
The timing of the merger process is as follows. First, the target sets a reserve price, r,
clearly indicates that merger activity is on average highly procycliclal (see e.g. Gugler et al, 2006).
9The results for the case in which firms have positive instead of zero fixed costs would be exactly the
same. Fixed costs may be a reason for which other firms do not enter in the medium term, as we assume
throughout the paper.
10Possibly c¯ > c, which means that a combination of two firms that have no fit may lead to higher
marginal costs. The efficiency reduction can happen because of, for example, post-merger integration
problems (Banal-Estan˜ol and Seldeslachts, 2005).
11All the results can be replicated for a continuous distribution of types. For ease of exposition, we
present the two-type model.
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at which it is willing to sell the company. Second, the acquirer either accepts or rejects.
If he accepts, the merger is carried out—i.e. the target receives a payoff of r and the
acquirer obtains the target’s production facility. Otherwise, the merger is abandoned.
Finally, all costs are revealed and the market game specified below is played. Observe
that by allowing the target to set a take-it-or-leave-it offer, we assume that the target
firm has all the bargaining power in the merger process.
The market game is a variant of Salop’s (1979) circular city model. There are three
products located equidistantly from each other on a circle with circumference one. On the
same circle, there is a mass M of consumers with differing tastes, uniformly distributed
and indexed by x ∈ [0, 1]. For any two locations x and y, let d(x, y) be their distance on
the circle. Utility of consumer x from buying product y at price p is v − t · d(x, y)2 − p,
where v − t · d(x, y)2 is her “satisfaction” with the good and −p is her disutility from
paying its price. In other words, x is the consumer’s “ideal variety”, which yields benefit
v. If a person consumes a product y different from her ideal, she suffers disutility equal to
t · d(x, y)2, where t is a measure of the differentiation between varieties of the product—
the so-called transportation cost.12 To avoid unenlightening extra notation, we assume a
consumer’s utility from not consuming is negative infinity, so that she always chooses to
buy one of the products.13 In this setup, the mass of consumers M is a natural measure
of the market size.
Firms’ simultaneously set prices for the products they own, and, upon observing these
prices, each consumer purchases the product that maximizes her utility. We solve for
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Furthermore, we restrict attention to interior equilibria in
which each product is sold to a positive mass of consumers.14
12The original Salop (1979) paper considered linear transportation costs. As Cabral (2003), we assume
quadratic transportation costs to ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibria following a merger for
a wide range of marginal costs.
13Our results would be identical if consumers had an option of not buying, but v was sufficiently high
(or costs and product differentiation sufficiently low) so that no consumer would take advantage of this
option in equilibrium.
14As we show in the appendix, a sufficient condition for the existence of such equilibria is that the
marginal cost of the merging firm after a merger satisfies c− 49 t ≤ cm ≤ c+ 59 t.
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3 Results
Solving the market game (see the appendix), if no merger takes place the market model
yields the following reduced form profits for each firm i = 1, 2, 3 :
pi∗i =
Mt
27
.
Suppose that two firms have merged. Then we show in the appendix that the total profits
of the merged company are
pi∗m =
M
3t
(
c− cm + 5t
9
)2
.
Then merging gives a relative profit with respect to not-merging of ∆pi∗m = pi
∗
m− 2pi∗i −R,
which, substituting from above, can be rewritten as
∆pi∗m =
M
3t
[(
c− cm + 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
−R. (1)
The acquirer accepts the reserve price r if and only if
pi∗m(cm)− r −R ≥ pi∗i .
The optimal reserve price of the target is one of the following three (types of) reserve
prices r. First, it can set the highest price such that both types of acquirers accept.
This “pooling” reserve price rp is such that the low type is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting, rp = pi∗m(c) − pi∗i − R. Second, it can set the highest price such that only
high types accept. At this “separating” reserve price, the high type is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting, rs = pi∗m(c) − pi∗i − R. Finally, it can set a reserve price such
that no buyer accepts. We denote (any) such prohibitively high reserve price by r∞,
r∞ > pi∗m(c)− pi∗i −R.
We next introduce a condition to ensure that the target might prefer to pool acquirers
rather than to screen them. In our model, this corresponds to ensure that pooling is better
in the absence of any restructuring cost. The condition requires that low-type acquirers
are not too different from high-type acquirers, or that there are enough low types around
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in order for the target to be willing to bet on meeting a low type. Using the relative
merger profits in equation (1) for both the high and the low type, this translates into the
inequality below.
Assumption 1 The prior q and the post-merger marginal costs c and c are such that(
c− c+ 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
≥ q ∗
[(
c− c+ 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
.
We are now ready to state our main proposition:
Proposition 1 If Assumption 1 holds, there exist strictly positive and finite market sizes
M and M such that for
• M < M, no takeover takes place;
• M ≤M < M, only high-type takeovers occur;
• M ≥M, both high-type and low-type takeovers occur.
Proof. We begin by comparing the target’s profit from screening (setting a reserve
price rs) to setting a prohibitively high reserve price r∞. The target strictly prefers the
separating over any prohibiting reserve price if and only if
q ∗ rs + (1− q) ∗ pi∗i > pi∗i ,
which is equivalent to
pi∗m(c)− 2pi∗i −R > 0,
which in turn is equivalent to
M
3t
[(
c− c+ 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
−R > 0.
The left-hand side is increasing in M (given that c < c), negative at M = 0 and positive
for high enough M . Hence, there exists a unique M , M ≡ 3tRh
(c−c+ 5t9 )
2− 2t2
9
i , such that if
M < M , the target strictly prefers r∞ and if M ≥ M, the target prefers rs. Following
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the same arguments (now using c < c and Assumption 1 to show that the left hand side
is increasing), there exists a unique M̂ , M̂ ≡ 3tRh
(c−c+ 5t9 )
2− 2t2
9
i > M, such that if M < M̂ ,
the target strictly prefers r∞ to the optimal pooling reserve price, rp, and if M ≥ M̂ the
target prefers rp to r∞.
The target strictly prefers setting the optimal pooling reserve price rp to rs if and only
if
rp > q ∗ rs + (1− q) ∗ pi∗i ,
which can be rewritten as
pi∗m(c)− pi∗i −R > q ∗ (pi∗m(c)− pi∗i −R) + (1− q) ∗ pi∗i ,
which in turn can be restated as
M
3t
[(
c− c+ 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
−R− q
(
M
3t
[(
c− c+ 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
−R
)
> 0.
Given Assumption 1, the left-hand side is increasing inM, negative atM = 0 and positive
for high enoughM . Hence, there exists a uniqueM such that ifM < M , the target strictly
prefers rs and if M ≥ M, the target prefers rp. Given that this function evaluated at M̂
is negative, one has M < M̂ < M .
To summarize, if M < M the target sets a prohibitive reserve price. If M ≤M < M ,
the target sets the separating reserve price and if M ≥ M, it sets the pooling reserve
price.
The intuition is simple. First, when consumer demand M is low, merger conditions
are bad: merger profits are low for a small market size and merging requires a fixed
cost R. Hence, it is unprofitable to merge. The target, thus, sets a reservation price
too high for any acquirer to accept. When merger conditions become better, high-type
mergers become profitable while low-type mergers remain unprofitable. By requesting a
high takeover price, the target extracts all post-merger efficiency gains if the acquirer it
meets is a high-type acquirer. By doing so, however, the target risks that the acquirer
is a “bad” acquirer in which case the takeover will be abandoned. As the market size
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increases and merger conditions become even better, mergers involving low-type acquirers
become profitable: pi∗m(c) − 2pi∗i − R ≥ 0. This does not mean, however, that the target
sets a reserve price that accommodates low-type acquirers. For if it would do so, it would
earn approximately zero benefits from the takeover while if it screens the acquirer it—
with a probability q—gets strictly positive benefits from the takeover. As the market
size increases even further, both high- and low-type mergers become more profitable.
Setting a price that is acceptable to low-type acquirers becomes more and more attractive
as otherwise the target cannot reap the positive merger profits from lower types, which
increase relatively faster than those of higher types. Hence, there exists a critical market
size at which the target is just indifferent between selling to the high types for a higher
price and selling to both types for a lower price. Above this critical market size, the target
strictly prefers to set a pooling reserve price.
Observe that above the critical market size at which the target sets the reservation
price rp such that all acquirers accept, high-type acquirers extract information rents
(pi∗m(c)− pi∗i −R)− rp = pi∗m(c)− pi∗m(c),
while below this critical market size they are exactly indifferent between acquiring and
abandoning the merger.
Corollary 1 For market sizes M ≤M < M, the target extracts all the merger rents. For
market sizes M ≥ M, the high-type acquirer earns rents pi∗m(c) − pi∗m(c) and the low-type
acquirer earns no rents.
There is evidence that in a merger wave bidders gain, on average, higher abnormal
returns than bidders outside waves. In a series of announcement return regressions for
bidders, Harford (2003) sets a dummy variable to one for acquisitions made during waves
and finds the dummy to be significantly positive in all specifications. Gugler et al. (2006)
find that, for tender offers, returns for wave-acquirers in the month of the acquisition are
1% higher than their non-wave counterparts. Finally, Rosen (2006) discovers that bidder
stock prices are more likely to increase when a merger is announced in a “hot” merger
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market, i.e. in periods when mergers cluster. These observations are in line with our
theoretical prediction.
There is also evidence that during merger waves, high-type acquirers gain more than
low-type acquirers at the announcement date.15 Carow et al. (2004) distinguish high-
and low-type acquirers in a merger wave and find that high types’ abnormal returns are
significantly higher for different (short-term) time windows.16
From the proposition, it is also clear that, on average, a merger is technologically less
efficient during a merger wave (pooling equilibrium). It may even be that merging firms
become less efficient than stand-alone firms, c > c. These mergers can occur when
∆pi∗m(c) =
M
3t
[(
c− c+ 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
−R ≥ 0,
which in the limit becomes
lim
M→∞
[∆pi∗m(c)] ≥ 0, (2)
which in turn is equivalent to
c¯ ≤ c+ (5− 3
√
2)t
9
. (3)
Thus, if inequality (3) and Assumption 1 hold, it may be that the merged entity is
technologically less efficient.
Corollary 2 At higher market sizes M ≥M, technologically less efficient mergers occur.
These mergers may even raise the marginal cost of the firms involved.
To relate this corollary with the existing empirical evidence, we provide a simple
framework that predicts differences in the long term profitability of mergers as a function
of the market size. In particular, we explain why we expect mergers that occur at high
values of M (and, thus, are on average technologically less efficient) to perform worse
15Carow at al. (2004) define types by, among others, the timing of merging in a wave, industry
relatedness, and form of payment.
16Measured as industry-adjusted returns over the interval of days [−1, 1] around the announcement of
the acquisition, high types earn 4.42% more than low types in the wave and this difference is statistically
significant; over the longer interval [−5, 5] the difference is still 4.23%.
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in the long run. The simplest justification would be to presume that all (stock) market
participants incorrectly presume the current demand conditions M to last forever while
in reality boom periods are systematically followed by more normal demand conditions.
In this case, since boom mergers have higher marginal cost on average, they perform
worse than non-boom mergers in the future. But even if the stock market participants
correctly foresee that current boom periods are followed by normal periods in the future,
our mechanism survives. For the sake of argument, we distinguish the market size in
the “near” and in the “distance” future. Suppose the market game is played twice.
First, in the near future with a market size M and, then, in the distant future with
(expected) market size M˜ . Payoffs of the distant future are discounted. Hence, a takeover
is more likely if the market size is large in the near future and small in the distant
future than vice versa. Thus, even if the market size switches deterministically between
good and bad conditions, we expect more takeover activity when current conditions are
good. Somewhat more realistically, suppose that demand can be either high or low and is
independently drawn for the near and the distance future. Then—since pooling is more
likely if near future demand is high—distant-future profits of mergers that occurred during
high demand periods are on average lower because these merged firms have on average
higher marginal costs. Thus empirical work that measures profits in the distant future,
should indicate that wave mergers perform worse.
Indeed, Gugler et al. (2006) demonstrate that, in the long term, wave mergers perform
on average significantly worse than non-wave mergers: The median abnormal return after
three years is more than 11% lower for wave-mergers. This is especially true for tender
offers, where the difference becomes 34%. Harford (2003) shows the wave-dummy to be
significantly negative for different specifications in long-run bidder performance regres-
sions. Also Rosen (2006) finds that long-run returns are significantly lower for mergers
announced in periods when the merger market was booming.17 Furthermore, there is a
17It must be added that Harford (2005) finds a positive effect for wave-mergers on expected long-term
earnings. He, however, compares specialists’ forecasts right before and right after the merger. Specialists
should reason in the same way as the firms in our model, which should lead to a positive evaluation at
the time of merging.
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clear difference between high- and low-type mergers during waves with respect to non-
merging firms. Carow et al. (2004) find out that the mean of high-type mergers enjoy
abnormal returns of almost 17% after three years with respect to non-merging firms in
the same industry. The other (low-type) mergers suffer a relative loss of more than 17%.
For a fixed c, it is also easy to see that the closer c and c are, the larger the region
where a pooling equilibrium exists.
Corollary 3 For a fixed c, smaller acquirers’ differences, c−c, implies equal critical mass
M but smaller M .
This result is again intuitive. The more similar (potential) acquirers become, the more
costly it is to gamble by setting a high (separating) reserve price. Following the previous
explanation, our model implies that smaller differences in long term values should be
correlated with periods of merger spikes. We are not aware of any work that tries to
test this prediction, which might be difficult to do. Potentially, however, one could use
the approach of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) who disentangle firms’ short- and long-term
valuations. Using the standard deviations of acquirers’ long term valuations (instead
of the means, as they do in their analysis), one could potentially test whether smaller
standard deviations correlate with merger clusters.
4 Generalization and Extensions
4.1 Market Competition
We briefly consider a more general market model. Let the economic condition be pa-
rameterized by a real variable b ∈ [bmin, bmax] with the interpretation that firms’ profits
are higher if b is greater. For a given economic condition, let piH(b) be the post-merger
profits if the target is bought by a high-type and let piL(b) be the profits in case the
target is bought by a low-type acquirer, with piH(b) and piL(b) being continuously differ-
entiable and piH(b) > piH(b) for any b. Denote the common prior that the acquirer is of
high-type again by q. Let piT (b) be the target’s and piA(b) the acquirer’s profit in the
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absence of a merger. We denote the net merger gain of a high-type merger by ∆piH(b),
i.e. ∆piH(b) = piH(b)− (piT (b) + piH(b)). Similarly, let ∆piL(b) be the net merger gain of a
low-type merger.
We say that a market model satisfies the regularity conditions if (1) the net-merger
gains of a high-type merger, ∆piH(b), increase in b and if (2) merging with a low type
becomes relatively more attractive as b increases, i.e. if ∆piL(b)/∆piH(b) increases in b.
The circular-city model introduced above satisfies the regularity conditions. We provide
other examples below.
We begin with an example that we view as a stylized model of international mergers.
Mergers in the example do not change the intensity of competition in any given market
but allow for the exploitation of cost advantages.
Example 1: Independent Markets : Initially, both firms (target and acquirer) operate in
separate local markets with, say, linear (inverse) demand (p = b−ax), where the demand
intercept b > c is a measure of the economic condition. A merger leads to efficiency gains
(i.e. a reduction in the marginal cost c), but requires a fixed up-front restructuring cost
R > 0. These efficiency gains can be either low leading to post-merger marginal costs
c < c or high leading to c < c. As we show in the Appendix, it is straightforward to check
that this setup satisfies the regularity conditions.
Next, we introduce a simple example in which a vertical merger with unknown synergy
gains eliminates the double marginalization problem. A merger here eliminates a stylized
contracting problem and may lead to reduction in marginal costs of producing.
Example 2: Vertical Merger: Initially, there are two firms—an upstream firm U and a
downstream firm D. The downstream firm produces the final product for consumers using
one unit of the upstream firm’s product to produce one unit of output. For simplicity, we
assume that the upstream firm produces its output at constant marginal cost c and that
the only costs of the downstream firm are the payments made to the upstream firm.
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The upstream firm sets a (linear) price pU at which it sells its output to the downstream
firm. After observing pU , the downstream firm sets a price pD to final consumers. The
demand in in the downstream market is x = b− pD, where the demand intercept b > c is
a measure of the economic condition.
Suppose the downstream firm is the (potential) target while the upstream firm is the
(potential) acquirer. The acquirer can be a high-type acquirer—in which case the post-
merger marginal cost are c—or a low-type acquirer with marginal cost c, where we assume
that c ≥ c > c. As we show in the Appendix, even absent any restructuring cost, this
example also satisfies the regularity conditions.
Obviously, the above examples can be considerably generalized.
Proposition 2 Suppose the market model satisfies the regularity conditions. Then merg-
ers are more likely to take place during economic booms, i.e. there exist b and b (∈
[bmin, bmax]) such that if b < b no merger takes place, if b < b < b only good mergers take
place, and if b > b all mergers take place.
The proof is analogous to the one for the circular-city model and is included in the
Appendix. The intuition is simple. When merger conditions are bad, no merger takes
place since it is never profitable to merge. Thus, the target sets a reservation price too
high for any acquirer to accept. When merger conditions become better, mergers with
high-type and low-type acquirers become profitable. But, the difference between piHand
piL is still large. By requesting a high takeover price, the target extracts all rents from the
post-merger efficiency gains if the acquirer is a “good” acquirer. By doing so, however, he
risks that the acquirer is a “bad” acquirer in which case the takeover will be abandoned.
Considering the probabilities and payoffs of these two events, the gains of setting a high
price and screening the acquirers are compared to the gains of setting a low price that all
acquirers are willing to accept.
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4.2 Multiple Bidders
Our model could also be extended to accommodate multiple bidders. As Inderst and
Wey (2004), assume that potential acquirers participate in an auction in which the target
can commit to an optimal reserve price. For simplicity, suppose a second-price sealed-bid
auction is used and that bidders play a (reasonable) equilibrium in which each bidder bids
the net-gain from the takeover (defined as the increase in profits in the market game if the
bidder succeeds in the takeover versus a situation in which the bidder does not succeed).
Suppose first that an outsider does not gain from another merger, as would, for ex-
ample, be the case if bidders and target were operating in different markets (Example 1
above). If one denotes the probability that none of the bidders is of high type as (1− q),
one would obtain the same results as in the single-bidder case. The target would again
face a trade-off between setting a pooling reserve price such that a merger occurs for
certain and setting a separating reserve price at a risk that none of the bidders is actually
of high type. If the outsiders strictly lose from a merger, the reserve prices and, therefore,
the thresholds would be quantitatively different. In a preemptive merger equilibrium (see
Molnar (2003) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005)), reserve prices and thresholds would
reflect not the gain from merging but the net gain of being an insider rather than remain-
ing as an outsider. If both insiders and outsiders gain from a merger then—as pointed out
by Inderst and Wey (2004) in a setting with symmetric bidders—a free-riding problem
between acquirers arises as long as bidders play a symmetric equilibrium.18 In this case,
Inderst and Wey (2004) show that it is optimal for the target to set a reserve price such
that a takeover occurs with probability less than one. As long as this reserve price for the
case of high synergies (our “separating” reserve price) is not accepted by the low synergy
types, we expect our results to also hold in this setting.
18There exists an asymmetric equilibrium with n-bidders in which only one bidder is active. Thus,
if independent of the reserve price bidders always play this asymmetric equilibrium, one gets the same
results as in our single-bidder model.
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5 Conclusions
We constructed a model in which the target screens the acquirer on the effectiveness of re-
alizing synergy gains, by setting the takeover price. As economic conditions become more
favorable, screening out relatively “bad” acquirers becomes less desirable. This leads to a
hike in merger activity. We, thus, provided a mechanism that can explain how a positive
change in economic fundamentals may generate a spike in merger activity, in line with the
observed procyclicality of merger waves. When economic conditions are better, efficiency
issues become less important in realizing merger profits. But, although positive economic
shocks produce gains at the time of merging, these mergers can develop into unprofitable
entities in an economic downturn, exactly due to this lack of screening. Furthermore,
again because of the lack of screening during economics booms, more efficient acquirers
are able to earn (short-term) positive merger profits, which they cannot during economics
downturns. We thus offered a simple explanation for why recent empirical evidence finds
that (1) wave-mergers are on average less efficient and thus less profitable in the long run
and (2) wave-acquirers are able to extract more rents at the time of merging.
Our model is consistent with efficient capital markets and managers maximizing the
value of the firm. Authors such as Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004) develop alternative models in which merger waves result from man-
agerial reactions to market misvaluations. Interestingly, our theoretical predictions partly
coincide with theirs, given that there is a high correlation between economic booms and
stock market booms. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) find in an empirical study evidence for
the misvaluation theories, but state that: “An alternative explanation [of our empirical
findings] is that aggregate merger intensity spikes when short-run growth opportunities
are high. However, the long-run growth opportunities go in the opposite direction; they
are negatively associated with merger intensities.” This explanation is consistent with
our mechanism if one relates short-run growth opportunities with demand and long-term
growth opportunities with a firm’s efficiency.
We provide an explanation of merger clustering based on asymmetric information
and screening. It reconciles the empirical regularities explained by the “neoclassical
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theories”—economic shocks have a determinant impact on merger clustering—with those
explained by the “behavioral theories”—wave mergers perform worse in the long term
(see Gugler et al., 2006, for a survey of these theories).
As most other models of merger waves, our theory is essentially non-strategic in the
sense that it does not explicitly accounts for the mechanism through which one merger
is related to others. Rather, our merger wave is characterized by an exogenous shift in
the economic environment—an upward shift in the market demand—that simultaneously
makes all mergers attractive. In contrast to other explanations, however, we attribute a
spike in merger activity mainly to a lack of screening, which has several new implications
that match recent empirical evidence. While a dynamic takeover model is beyond the
scope of the current paper, strategic elements can be included in our setting. For exam-
ple, if all mergers take place in the same industry, screening may be less important in
subsequent mergers.19 We leave a full investigation of this question to future research.
Appendix
Circular City Model
In this appendix, we compute the equilibrium profits for the circular city model. We begin
by assuming that, in equilibrium, each product is sold to a positive mass of consumers.
Denote as di ≡ d(x, yi) the distance between a consumer with ideal location x and product
i, which is located at yi. Hence, the “transportation” cost of consumer x if she buys
product i is d2i t and her utility is v − d2i t− pi. Since the utility from not buying the good
is negative infinity, each consumer solves
max
i
v − d2i t− pi.
Given a distance of 1/3 between products, the transportation costs of consumer x to
neighboring product j = i+1 mod 3 (i.e. in case i = 3 one has j = 1) will be (1
3
− di)2t if
19This effect would, for example, arise if high-type acquirers move early so that the probability of facing
a high-type acquirer, and therefore the benefit of screening, is lower in later mergers.
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she is located between product i and j. Similar, the transportation cost will be (di− 13)2t
if she is located further away.20 Apart from transportation costs, consumers will take into
account the prices charged for products i and j. Hence, as long as no product is priced out
of the market altogether, the boundary between the two products will be at a location x
at which the generalized costs are equal, i.e.
pi + d
2
i t = pj +
(
1
3
− di
)2
t.
It is straightforward to solve for boundary distance di. Since there is a mass M of
consumers uniformly distributed on the unit circle, the demand for product i by con-
sumers that are located on the ‘one side’ of product i, diM =
(
3(pj−pi)
2t
+ 1
6
)
M. Anal-
ogous, we derive demand for the consumers on the other side of product i, which is
diM =
(
3(pk−pi)
2t
+ 1
6
)
M. Hence, total demand for product i is
qci (pi, pj, pk) =
(
3 (pj + pk − 2pi)
2t
+
1
3
)
M. (4)
Now consider first the case in which there are three firms each owning one product.
Restricting attention to the case in which each product is sold to a positive mass of
consumers, profits are
Πi = (pi − c)
(
3(pj + pk − 2pi)
2t
+
1
3
)
M. (5)
The (candidate) optimal price is then found by letting ∂Πi
∂pi
= 0. By symmetry, pi = pj =
pk = p
∗, and
p∗ = c+
t
9
. (6)
Observe that a firm would have to charge a price at or below marginal cost to price
its neighbor out the market, which is clearly an unprofitable deviation. Thus, non-local
20Notice that the indifferent consumer between product i and j must be located at a distance less than
1/2 from product i because if the consumer located at a distance 1/2 from product i prefers product i
to j then all consumers on the circle prefer i to j. Furthermore, under the assumption that all products
are sold, such an indifferent consumer must exist.
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deviations are unprofitable and p∗ is the equilibrium price. Substituting the equilibrium
prices into the demand function (4) yields equilibrium demand
q∗ =
M
3
. (7)
Substituting equilibrium prices (6) and quantities (7) in the profit function (5) yields
pi∗i = pi
∗
j = pi
∗
k =
Mt
27
.
The next step is to determine profits after the merger under the maintained assumption
that each product is sold to some consumers. Let Πm denote the post-merger profit of the
insiders i and j, which produces both products at constant marginal costs ci = cj = cm.
The merged firm’s profit function is given by
Πm = (pi − cm)
(
3(pj + pk − 2pi)
2t
+
1
3
)
M
+(pj − cm)
(
3(pi + pk − 2pj)
2t
+
1
3
)
M, (8)
and the first order condition with respect to prices of product i is ∂Πm
∂pi
= 0. The outsider o’s
first order condition is as in the single-product case. Simplifying, we obtain the candidate
post-merger equilibrium price of the outsider o,
p∗o =
1
27
(9cm + 18c+ 4t),
and the (identical) candidate post-merger price for each of the two insiders’ products,
p∗m =
1
27
(18cm + 9c+ 5t).
Using the demand function (4) and the candidate equilibrium prices, we determine
total quantity of the insiders,
q∗m = 2
(
3(p∗o − p∗m)
2t
+
1
3
)
M = M
(
c− cm
t
+
5
9
)
,
and the total quantity of the outsider,
q∗o = M −M
(
c− cm
t
+
5
9
)
= M
(
4
9
− c− cm
t
)
.
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Substituting candidate equilibrium quantities and prices into the profit function (8) yields
pi∗m = (p
∗
m − cm) q∗m =
Mt
3
(
c− cm
t
+
5
9
)2
,
and
pi∗o = (p
∗
o − c) q∗o =
Mt
3
(
4
9
− c− cm
t
)2
.
We now check whether our candidate equilibrium satisfies the assumption that all products
are sold to a positive mass of consumers. The merged firm sells a positive quantity of
each product if p∗o + (
1
2
)2t > p∗m + (
1
2
− 1
3
)2t, and therefore if p∗o > p
∗
m − 29t, which,
substituting, is satisfied when cm− c < 59t. Similarly, the outsider sells a positive quantity
when p∗m + (
1
3
)2t > p∗o, and therefore when p
∗
m > p
∗
o − 19t, which, substituting, is equal to
c − cm < 49t. Summarizing, each product is sold to a positive mass of consumers as long
as
−4
9
t < cm − c < 5
9
t.
To prove that the candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium for the above range of cost
differences, we need to show that it is unprofitable to deviate to a situation in which not all
products are sold. Observe that it is never a best response for the merged firm to sell only
one of its products. This cannot be a best response because by lowering the price for the
product it does not sell to the same level as for the other product, the merged firm would
gain market share while selling at the (same) price above marginal cost. Furthermore,
situations in which a firm (just) prices its competitor out of the market are limiting cases
of the above and, hence, it is unprofitable to do so.
The net gains from merging for insiders are then given by ∆pi∗m = pi
∗
m − (pi∗i + pi∗j ) or
∆pi∗m =
M
3t
[(
c− cm + 5t
9
)2
− 2t
2
9
]
,
whereas the outsider’s change in profits are given by ∆pi∗o = pi
∗
o − pi∗k or
∆pi∗o =
M
3t
[(
4t
9
− (c− cm)
)2
− t
2
9
]
.
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Proof of the Claim in Example 1
The net profits from merging are given by
∆pi∗m(cm) = 2
(
(b− cm)2
4a
− (b− c)
2
4a
)
−R.
Taking the first derivative with respect to b and simplifying,
∂ (∆pi∗m(c))
∂b
=
c− c
4a
> 0,
since b > c > c > c. Similarly,
∆pi∗m(c)
∆pi∗m(c)
=
(b− c)2 − (b− c)2 − 2aR
(b− c)2 − (b− c)2 − 2aR,
and therefore,
∂
(
∆pi∗m(c)
∆pi∗m(c)
)
∂b
=
2(c− c) [(c− c)(c− c) + 2aR]
[(b− c)2 − (b− c)2 − 2aR]2 > 0.
Proof of the Claim in Example 2
The net profits from merging are given by
∆pi∗m(cm) =
(b− cm)2
4
− (b− c)
2
8
− (b− c)
2
16
.
Deriving and simplifying,
∂ (∆pi∗m(c))
∂b
=
b+ 3c− 4c
8
> 0,
since b > c > c > c. Similarly,
∆pi∗m(c)
∆pi∗m(c)
=
(b−c)2
4
− (b−c)2
8
− (b−c)2
16
(b−c)2
4
− (b−c)2
8
− (b−c)2
16
.
Rewriting and differentiating yields
∂
(
∆pi∗m(c)
∆pi∗m(c)
)
∂b
=
8(c− c) [b2 + 3c2 + 4cc− (b+ 3c)(c+ c)]
[b2 + 6bc− 3c2 − 8bc+ 4c2]2 .
Therefore, this derivative has the same sign as the numerator. Since c > c it suffices to
establish that f(c) ≡ b2+3c2+4cc−(b+3c)(c+c) > 0. We have that f ′(c) = 4c−(b+3c) < 0
and c < c and f(c) > f(c) = (b− c)(b− c) > 0. Hence, the derivative is positive.
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Proof of Proposition 2
As we look for optimal reserve prices for the target, we can restrict attention to the reserve
prices such that either the low-cost type is indifferent between accepting and rejecting,
rp = piL(b)− piA(b) , or such that the high-cost type is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting, rs(b) = piH(b)− piA(b), or such that no buyer accepts, r∞ > piH(b)− piA(b).
The target will strictly prefer the separating over the prohibiting reserve price if and
only if qrs(b)+(1− q)piT (b) > piT (b), which is equivalent to ∆piH(b) > 0. By the regularity
condition, there exists a unique b ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that if b < b the target strictly prefers
r∞(b) and if b > b the target strictly prefers rs(b).
The target will strictly prefer the pooling over the prohibiting reserve price if and only
if rp(b) > piT (b), which is equivalent to ∆piL(b) > 0. Since, trivially, ∆piH(b) > ∆piL(b) the
optimal reserve price is prohibitive if b < b and if b > b the optimal reserve price is either
separating or pooling. Notice that if b = bmax the target always prefer the prohibiting
reserve price and therefore b = bmax. Suppose from now on that b < bmax.
The target strictly prefers the pooling over the separating reserve price if and only if
rp(b) > qrs(b) + (1− q)piT (b), which is equivalent to ∆piL(b)− q∆piH(b) > 0. We are now
going to show that the regularity condition implies that there exists a unique b ∈ [b, bmax]
such that if b < b the target strictly prefers rs(b) and if b > b the target strictly prefers
rp(b).
Let f(b) ≡ ∆piL(b)− q∆piH(b). We will establish that for any b∗ such that f(b∗) = 0,
one has f ′(b∗) > 0. Since f(·) is continuously differentiable, this establishes that there
exists at most one b∗ ∈ [b, bmax]. This together with the fact that f ′(b∗) > 0 establishes
the existence of a unique b ∈ [b, bmax] such that if b < b then f(b) < 0 and if b > b then
f(b) > 0.
Consider any b∗ ∈ [b, bmax] for which f(b∗) = 0. Since b∗ ≥ b, ∆piH(b∗) ≥ 0. Fur-
thermore, since ∆piH(b∗) > ∆piL(b∗), ∆piH(b∗) > 0. The regularity condition (i.e. that
∂
∂b
[
∆piL(b)
∆piH(b)
]
> 0) implies that ∂∆pi
L(b)
∂b
∆piH(b) − ∂∆piH(b)
∂b
∆piL(b) > 0 for all b. By def-
inition of b∗, ∆piL(b∗) = q∆piH(b∗). Thus, ∂∆pi
L(b∗)
∂b
∆piH(b∗) − ∂∆piH(b∗)
∂b
q∆piH(b∗) > 0.
Given that ∆piH(b∗) > 0, it follows that ∂∆pi
L(b∗)
∂b
− ∂∆piH(b∗)
∂b
q > 0. Finally, since f ′(b∗) =
23
∂∆piL(b∗)
∂b
− q ∂∆piH(b∗)
∂b
, we have that f ′(b∗) > 0.
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